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Abstract
We study the principal-agent problem. We show that b-convexity
of the space of products, a condition which appears in a recent paper
by Figalli, Kim and McCann [8], is necessary to formulate the problem
as a maximization over a convex set. We then show that when the
dimension m of the space of types is larger than the dimension n of
the space of products, this condition implies that the extra dimensions
do not encode independent economic information. When m is smaller
than n, we show that under b-convexity of the space of products, it
is always optimal for the principal to offer goods only from a certain
prescribed subset. We show that this is equivalent to offering an m-
dimensional space of goods.
1 Introduction
This paper concerns principal-agent type problems, which arise frequently in
a variety of different contexts in economic theory. The following formulation
can be found in Wilson [24], Armstrong [1] and Rochet and Chone [19]. A
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monopolist wants to sell goods to a distribution of buyers. Knowing only the
preference b(x, y) that a buyer of type x ∈ X has for a good of type y ∈ Y ,
the density dµ(x) of the buyer types and the cost c(y) to produce the good y,
the monopolist must decide which goods to produce and how much to charge
for them in order to maximize her profits.
When the distribution of buyer types X and the available goods Y are ei-
ther discrete or 1-dimensional, this problem is well understood [21][14][16][4].
However, it is typically more realistic to distinguish between both consumer
types and goods by more than one characteristic. An illuminating illustra-
tion of this is outlined by Figalli, Kim and McCann [8]: consumers buying
automobiles may differ by, for instance, their income and the length of their
daily commute, while the vehicles themselves may vary according to their
fuel efficiency, safety, comfort and engine power, for example. It is desirable,
then, to study models where the respective dimensions m and n of X and Y
are greater than 1 [13][18][20]. This multi-dimensional screening problem is
much more difficult and relatively little is known about it; for a review and
an extensive list of references, see the book by Basov [3]
When m = n and the preference function b(x, y) := x · f(y) is linear in
types, Rochet and Chone developed an algorithm for studying this problem
[19]. A key element in their analysis is that, in this case, the problem may
be formulated mathematically as an optimization problem over the set of
convex functions, which is itself a convex set. They were then able to deduce
the existence and uniqueness of an optimal pricing strategy, as well as several
interesting economic characteristics of it. Basov then analyzed the case where
b is linear in types but m 6= n [2]. When m < n, he was able to essentially
reduce the n-dimensional space Y to an m-dimensional space of artificial
goods and then apply the machinery of Rochet and Chone. When m > n, no
such reduction is possible in general. Under additional hypotheses, however,
he showed that the solution actually coincides with the solution to a similar
problem where both spaces are m-dimensional.
For more general preference functions, Carlier, using tools from the theory
of optimal transportation, was able to formulate the problem as the maxi-
mization of a functional P over a certain set of functions Ub,φ (a subset of
the so called b-convex functions, which will be defined below) [6]. He was
then able to assert the existence of a solution to this problem; that is, the
existence of an optimal pricing schedule; an equivalent result is also proved
in [15]. However, for general functions b, the set of b-convex functions may
not be convex and so characterizing the solution using either computational
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or theoretical tools is an extremely imposing task. Very little progress had
been made in this direction until recently, when Figalli, Kim and McCann [8]
found necessary and sufficient conditions on b for Ub,φ to be convex, assuming
n = m. Convexity is a very powerful tool in variational problems of this type,
which can be exploited both theoretically and numerically. Assuming in ad-
dition that the cost c is b-convex, Figalli, Kim and McCann demonstrated
that the functional P is concave and from here were able to prove unique-
ness of the solution and demonstrate that some of the interesting economic
features observed by Rochet and Chone persist in this setting. Surprisingly,
the tools they use are also adapted from an optimal transportation context;
their necessary and sufficient condition is derived from a condition developed
by Ma, Trudinger and Wang [12], governing the regularity of optimal maps.
Although the result of Figalli, Kim andMcCann represents major progress,
it is limited in that they had to assume that the spaces of types and prod-
ucts were of the same dimension. There are many interesting and relevant
economic models in which these spaces have different dimensions, as outlined
in, for example, Basov [3]. Our primary goal here is to study how the results
in [8] extend to the case when m 6= n; in particular, we want to determine
under what conditions the set of b-convex functions is convex for general val-
ues of m and n. Our first contribution is to establish a necessary condition
for the convexity of this set. This condition, known as b-convexity of Y , was
a hypothesis in [8]; prior to that, to the best of my knowledge, it had not
been explored in the principal-agent context, although it is well known in
the optimal transportation literature, since the work of Ma, Trudinger and
Wang [12].
We then study separately the cases m > n and m < n. The analysis here
parallels the author’s recent work on the regularity of optimal transportation
between spaces whose dimensions differ [17]. When m > n, we show that the
b-convexity of Y implies that the dimensions cannot differ in a meaningful
way. That is, although bmay appear to depend on anm dimensional variable,
there is a natural disintegration of X into smooth sub-manifolds of dimension
m− n such that, no matter how the monopolist sets her prices, types in the
same sub-manifold always choose the same good. Therefore, types in the
same set are indistinguishable, and rather than working in an m dimensional
space, we may as well identify the types in a single sub-manifold and work
instead in the resulting n dimensional quotient space.
When n > m, the generalized Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition,
found for example in Basov [3], cannot hold and consequently consumers’
3
marginal utilities cannot uniquely determine which product they buy. In
this case, given a price schedule, a certain buyer’s surplus may be maximized
by many different goods, making him indifferent between those goods. The
monopolist’s profits will be very different, however, depending on which good
the buyer chooses. A naive possible solution would be to only produce from
the indifference set the good which maximizes the monopolist’s profit; how-
ever, in doing so, she may exclude a good which would maximize her profit
from another buyer. It turns out that the b-convexity on X (which was also
an assumption in [8]) precludes this from happening; under this condition,
we can again reduce the problem to one where the two spaces share the same
dimension. A special case of this result where b(x, y) = x ·v(y) for a function
v : Y 7→ Rm was established by Basov [2].
2 Assumptions and mathematical formulation
We will assume that the space of types X ⊆ Rm and the space of goods
Y ⊆ Rn are open and bounded.
Before formulating the problem mathematically, we recall the conditions
on b imposed by Figalli, Kim and McCann. Our formulations will appear
slightly different, as they must apply to the more general case m 6= n; when
n = m they coincide exactly with the conditions in [8]. In what follows,
Dxb(x, y) ∈ R
m and Dyb(x, y) ∈ R
n will denote the differentials of b with
respect to x and y respectively. D2xyb(x, y) will denote the m × n matrix of
mixed, second order, partial derivatives.
(B0): The function b ∈ C4(X × Y ).
(B1): (bi-twist) For all x0 ∈ X and y0 ∈ Y , the level sets of the maps
y 7→ Dxb(x0, y) and x 7→ Dyb(x, y0) are connected and D
2
xyb(x0, y0) has full
rank.
(B2): For all x0 ∈ X and y0 ∈ Y , the images Dxb(x0, Y ) and Dyb(X, y0) are
convex. If Dxb(x0, Y ) is convex for all x0, we say that Y is b-convex, while if
Dyb(X, y0) is convex for all y0 we say that X is b-convex.
(B3): For all x0 ∈ X and y0 ∈ Y , we have
∂4
∂t2∂s2
b(x(s), y(t))
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(0,0)
≥ 0,
whenever the curves s ∈ [−1, 1] 7→ Dyb(x(s), y0) and t ∈ [−1, 1] 7→ Dxb(x0, y(t))
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form affinely parametrized line segments.
(B3u): (B3) holds and, whenever x˙(0) ·D2xyb(x0, y0) 6= 0 and D
2
xyb(x0, y0) ·
y˙(0) 6= 0, the inequality is strict.
As was emphasized by Figalli, Kim and McCann, these conditions are in-
variant under reparametrization of X and Y . This means that they are in
some sense economically natural; they do not depend on the coordinates used
to parametrize the problem [8].
Let us take a moment to explain the meaning of condition (B1). Assume
momentarily that m ≥ n. Then the full rank condition implies that y 7→
Dxc(x0, y) is locally injective and so connectedness of its level sets implies
its global injectivity. Hence, we recover the generalized Spence-Mirrlees, or
generalized single crossing, condition found in, for example, Basov [3] (more
precisely, we obtain the strengthened version in [8]). On the other hand, if
m < n, the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition cannot hold; however, as
we will establish, in certain cases (B1) is a suitable replacement.
Much of our attention here will be devoted to (B2). For a bilinear b,
this condition coincides with the usual notion of convexity of the sets X and
Y ; for more general b, it implies convexity of X and Y after an appropriate
change of coordinates [8]. We will see in the next section that the convexity of
Dxb(x0, Y ) ⊆ R
m is a necessary condition for the monopolist’s problem to be
a convex program; in section 5, we will show that when m < n the convexity
ofDyb(X, y0) ⊆ R
n reduces the problem to a more tractable problem in equal
dimensions.
The relevance of (B3) and (B3u) to economic problems was established
in [8]. They are, respectively, strengthenings of the conditions (A3w) and
(A3), which are well known in optimal transportation due to their intimate
connection with the regularity of optimal maps [12] [11]. Background on
optimal transportation can be found in [22] [23].
We are now ready to review the mathematical formulation of the principal-
agent problem. Suppose that the monopolist sets a price schedule v(y); v(y)
is the price she charges for good y. Buyer x chooses to buy the good that
maximizes b(x, y)− v(y). We therefore define the utility for buyer x to be
vb(x) = sup
y∈Y
b(x, y)− v(y)
Functions of this type are called b-convex functions; we will denote by Ub
the set of all such functions.
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We assume the existence of a yφ ∈ Y that the monopolist must offer at
cost; that is, for any price schedule v
v(yφ) = c(yφ) (1)
If both sides in equation (1) are equal to zero, we can interpret yφ as
the null good, and equation (1) as representing the consumers’ option not to
purchase any product (and the monopolist’s obligation not to charge them
should they exercise this option). Note that the restriction v(yφ) = c(yφ)
immediately implies vb(x) ≥ uφ(x) := b(x, yφ)− c(yφ).
Let yvb(x) ∈ argmaxy∈Y (b(x, y)− v(y)). Assuming that a buyer of type x
chooses to buy good yvb(x)
1, the monopolist’s profits from this buyer is then
v(yvb(x)) − c(yvb(x)) = b(x, yvb(x)) − v
b(x) − c(yvb(x)) and her total profits
are:
P (vb) :=
∫
x
b(x, yvb(x))− v
b(x)− c(yvb(x))dµ(x)
The monopolist’s goal, of course, is to maximize her profits. That is, to
maximize P (vb) over the set Ub,φ of b-convex functions which are everywhere
greater than uφ (and, if the generalized Spence-Mirlees condition fails to hold,
over all functions yvb(x) ∈ argmaxy∈Y (b(x, y)− v(y))).
The main result of [8] is that when m = n, under hypotheses (B0)-(B2)
convexity of the set Ub,φ is equivalent to (B3).
3 b-convexity of the space of products
This section establishes the following result, which is novel even when m = n.
Proposition 3.1. If Y is not b-convex at some point x ∈ X, the set Ub,φ is
not convex.
Proof. Suppose Y is not b-convex at x ∈ X . Then there exist y0, y1 ∈ Y and
a t ∈ (0, 1) such that (1− t) ·Dxb(x, y0) + t ·Dxb(x, y1) /∈ Dxb(x, Y ).
Now, choose b-convex functions vb0, v
b
1 ≥ uφ such that v
b
i is differentiable
at x and Dvbi (x) = Dxb(x, yi), for i = 0, 1. Define v
b
t = (1− t) · v
b
0 + t · v
b
1; we
1The generalized Spence-Mirlees condition implies that for almost all x, there is exactly
one y maximizing b(x, y)− v(y), and so under this condition, the function yvb is uniquely
determined from vb almost everywhere.
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will show that vbt is not b-convex, which will imply that Ub,φ is not convex.
Now,
Dvbt (x) = (1− t) ·Dv
b
0(x) + t ·Dv
b
1(x)
= (1− t) ·Dxb(x, y0) + t ·Dxb(x, y1) /∈ Dxb(x, Y ) (2)
Now, assume vbt is b-convex; then
vbt (x) = sup
y∈Y
b(x, y)− vt(y) (3)
for some price schedule vt. Without loss of generality, we may assume vt is b-
convex: vt(x) = supx∈X b(x, y)−v
b
t (x), which implies that vt(x) is continuous
[9]. By compactness of Y and continuity of y 7→ b(x, y)−vt(y), the supremum
in (3) is attained by some yt ∈ Y , v
b
t (x) = b(x, yt)−v
b(yt). Now, for all x ∈ X ,
we have vbt (x) ≥ b(x, yt) − vt(yt) and so the function x 7→ v
b
t (x) − b(x, yt) is
minimized at x = x. It now follows that Dvbt (x) = Dxb(x, yt) ∈ Dxb(x, Y ),
contradicting (2). We conclude that vbt cannot be b-convex. As v
b
t is a
weighted average of b-convex functions, this yields the desired result.
Remark 3.2. This result can be seen as a slight strengthening of the result
of Figalli, Kim and McCann [8]; assuming n = m, (B0), (B1) and the
b-convexity of X, the main result of [8] combines with Proposition 3.1 to
imply that the convexity of Ub,φ is equivalent to the b-convexity of Y and
(B3). We will see in the next section that this extends nominally to the case
m > n, although, as we will show, in that case Y cannot be b-convex unless
all the economic information encoded in X can actually be encoded in an
n-dimensional space.
An important consequence on the convexity of Ub,φ is the uniqueness of the
optimal pricing schedule. Assuming that the cost c is strictly b-convex, P is
strictly concave functionl; if it is defined on a concave set, its maximum must
be unique. The following elementary example shows that when b-convexity
of Y (and hence convexity of Ub,φ) fails, the principal’s optimal strategy may
not be unique.
Example 3.3. Let X = [0, 1] be the unit interval and Y = {0, 1} be a set
of two points, including the null good 0; that is, the principle only offers one
good, y = 1. Take b(x, y) = xy+y to be bilinear and c(y) = y2. Let the density
of consumer types be f(x) = 60x2−80x+29. To make a profit, the price v the
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principal sets for her good must be between 1 and 2; she clearly cannot make
money by charging less than the cost 12 = 1 of producing the good y = 1,
and if she sets the price higher than 2, every consumer would opt out. A
straightforward calculation shows that her profits are (v− 3
2
)2−20(v− 3
2
)4+1
which is maximized at v = 3
2
± 1
2
√
10
.
The profit functional, written in terms of the utility functions vb(x) =
supy∈Y xy + y − v(y) is
∫ 1
0
x
dvb
dx
+
dvb
dx
− vb − (
dvb
dx
)2dx
which is strictly concave. However, the only allowable price schedules are of
the form v(0) = 0, v(1) = v ∈ [1, 2] and so the only allowable utility functions
are of the form
vb(x) = max
y=0,1
xy + y − v(y) (4)
= max{0, x− v + 1} (5)
for some constant v ∈ [1, 2]. The convex interpolant of two functions of this
form fails to have the same form; that is, the set of allowable utilities is not
convex, precisely because the space Y is not convex (recall that convexity and
b-convexity of Y are equivalent for bilinear preferences). Hence, uniqueness
fails. If the principal had access to a convex set of goods (for example, the
whole space [0, 1]) she could construct a more sophisticated pricing strategy
which would earn her a higher profit than either of the maxima exhibited in
this example.
4 m > n
In this section we focus on the case where m > n. We will show that
the b-convexity of the space of products Y implies that X can be reduced
to an n-dimensional space without losing any economic information. The
analysis in this section strongly parallels the author’s work on the regularity
of optimal maps in an analogous setting [17]. Though many of the proofs
in this section are similar to those in [17], we reproduce them here for the
reader’s convenience.
The definition below concerns the subset Dxb(x, Y ) ⊆ R
m; in general,
condition (B1) ensures that this set is an n-dimensional submanifold of Rm.
8
Definition 4.1. We say the domain Y looks b-linear from x ∈ X if Dxb(x, Y )
is contained in a shifted n-dimensional, linear subspace of Rm. We say Y is
b-linear with respect to X if it looks b-linear from every x ∈ X.
When m = n, b-linearity is automatically satisfied. When m > n, this
is no longer true; Dxb(x, Y ) is an n-dimensional submanifold that may or
may not be contained in an n-dimensional shifted linear subspace. However,
if Dxb(x, Y ) is convex, it must be contained in such a subspace and so b-
convexity clearly implies b-linearity.
We will also have reason to consider the level set of x 7→ Dyb(x, y) passing
through x, Lx(y) := {x ∈ X : Dyb(x, y) = Dyb(x, y)}.
The relationship between b-linearity and the sets Lx(y) is expressed by
the following result.
Lemma 4.2. (i) Y looks b-linear from x ∈ X if and only if Tx(Lx(y)) is
independent of y; that is Tx(Lx(y0)) = Tx(Lx(y1)) for all y0, y1 ∈ Y .
(ii) If the level sets Lx(y) are all connected, then Y is b-linear with respect
to X if and only if Lx(y) is independent of y for all x
Proof. We first prove (i). The tangent space Tx(Lx(y)) to Lx(y) at x is
the null space of the matrix D2yxb(x, y), which, in turn, is the orthogonal
complement of the range of its transpose, D2xyb(x, y). Therefore, Tx(Lx(y))
is independent of y if and only if the range of D2xyb(x, y) is independent of y.
But D2xyb(x, y) is the derivative of the map y 7→ Dxb(x, y), and so its range
is independent of y if and only if the image of this map is linear.
To see (ii), note that (i) implies Y is b-linear with respect to X if and
only if Tx(Lx(y0)) = Tx(Lx(y1)) for all x ∈ X and all y0, y1 ∈ Y . But
Tx(Lx(y0)) = Tx(Lx(y1)) for all x is equivalent to Lx(y0) = Lx(y1) for all x;
this immediately yields (ii).
Our goal is to identify conditions on b under which Ub,φ is convex; Propo-
sition 3.1 and Lemma 4.2 imply that this cannot be the case unless the sets
Lx(y) are independent of y. For the rest of this section, we will therefore
assume that the sets Lx(y) are in fact independent of y; we will henceforth
denote them simply by Lx. We will show next that, no matter what pricing
schedule the principal chooses, consumers in the same Lx will always choose
the same good and so, at least for the purposes of this problem, different
points in the same Lx do not really represent different types.
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Lemma 4.3. Assume each Lx(y) is connected and independent of y. For
any x0, x1 ∈ X such that x0 ∈ Lx1, y ∈ Y and b-concave v
b we have vb(x0) =
b(x0, y)− v(y) if and only if v(x1) = b(x1, y)− v(y).
Proof. First note that as Dyb(x0, y) − Dyb(x1, y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y , the
difference b(x0, y) − b(x1, y) is independent of y. Now, suppose v
b(x0) =
b(x0, y)− v(y). Then
vb(x1) = inf
y∈Y
b(x1, y)− v(y)
= inf
y∈Y
(
b(x1, y)− b(x0, y) + b(x0, y)− v(y)
)
= b(x1, y)− b(x0, y) + inf
y∈Y
(
b(x0, y)− v(y)
)
= b(x1, y)− b(x0, y) + v
b(x0)
= b(x1, y)− v(y)
The proof of the converse is identical.
We can now reformulate the monopolist’s problem as a problem between
two n-dimensional spaces. To do this, we define an effective space of types,
by essentially identifying all consumer types in a single Lx as a single effective
type.
Fix some y0 ∈ Y and define the space of effective types Z := Dyb(X, y0) ⊆
R
n and the map Q : X → Z via Q(x) := Dyb(x, y0). We define an effective
preference function: h : Z × Y → R via
h(z, y) = b(x, y)− b(x, y0),
where x ∈ Q−1(z). We must check that h is well defined, that is
b(x, y)− b(x, y0) = b(x, y)− b(x, y0),
or equivalently
B(x, x, y, y0) := b(x, y)− b(x, y0)− b(x, y) + b(x, y0) = 0,
for all x ∈ Lx and y ∈ Y . This is easily verified; the identity clearly holds at
y = y0 and as DyB(x, x, y, y0) vanishes, it must hold for all y.
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Given a price schedule v(y), we define the corresponding effective utility
as,
vh(z) = sup
y∈Y
h(z, y)− v(y)
= sup
y∈Y
b(x, y)− b(x, y0)− v(y)
= −b(x, y0) + sup
y∈Y
b(x, y)− v(y)
= −b(x, y0) + v
b(x) (6)
for any x ∈ Q−1(z). An effective consumer of type z chooses the product
at which this supremum is attained; we define this map to be yvh(z). It
is clear from the preceding calculation that, for every x ∈ Q−1(z) we have
yvb(x) = yvh(z). Define the distribution of effective consumer types to be the
pushforward measure ν = Q#µ . Define the monopolist’s effective profits to
be
Peff(v
h) =
∫
Z
(h(z, yvh(z))− v
h(z)− c(yvh(z)))dν(z)
The next theorem implies that maximizing the monopolist’s effective prof-
its is equivalent to maximizing her profits.
Theorem 4.4. For any pricing schedule, the monopolist’s effective profits
are equal to her profits.
Proof.
P (vb) =
∫
X
(b(x, yvb(x))− v
b(x)− c(yvb(x)))dµ(x)
=
∫
X
(b(x, yvh(Q(x)))− v
h(Q(x))− b(x, y0)− c(yvh(Q(x))))dµ(x)
=
∫
X
(h(Q(x), yvh(Q(x)))− v
h(Q(x))− c(yvh(Q(x))))dµ(x)
=
∫
Z
(h(z, yvh(z))− v
h(z)− c(yvh(z)))dν(x)
= Peff(v
h)
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The following corollary now follows immediately.
Corollary 4.5. Assume (B0) and (B1). Then one of the following holds.
1. Ub,φ is not convex.
2. The space of types can be reduced to an n-dimensional space of effective
types, and solving the monopolist’s problem with this effective space of
types is equivalent to solving her original problem.
According to Figalli, Kim and McCann [8], this new, equal dimensional
problem is a maximization over a convex set, provided that the conditions
(B0)-(B3) hold for h, Z and Y ; meanwhile, to ensure strict convexity of the
functional Peff and uniqueness of the optimizer, one needs either (B3u) and
the h-convexity of g or the strict h-convexity of g. It is therefore desirable
to be able to test these properties using only the information present in the
original problem; that is, using b and X rather than h and Z.
Before proceeding, we make a useful (local) identification between Z and
certain subsets ofX , following the analysis in [17]. Pick a point z0 ∈ Z and se-
lect x0 ∈ Q
−1(z0). Now, let S be an n-dimensional surface passing though x0
which intersects Lx0 transversely; note that this implies R
m = TxLx0
⊕
TxS.
As the null space of the matrix D2yxb(x0, y0) is precisely TxLx0 for any y, it
is invertible when restricted to Tx0S; by the inverse function theorem, the
map Q(·) = Dyb(·, y0) restricts to a local diffeomorphism on S. For all z
near z0, there is a unique x ∈ S ∩ Q
−1(z) and we have h(z, y) = b(x, y) −
b(x, y0); we can now identify Dzh(z, y) ≈ Dxb|S×Y (x, y)−Dxb|S×Y (x, y0) and
D2zyh(z, y) ≈ D
2
xyb|S×Y (x, y).
We are now ready to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6. (i) If b satisfies (B1) on X × Y , then h satisfies (B1) on
Z × Y .
(ii) If b satisfies (B2) on X × Y , then h satisfies (B2) on Z × Y .
Proof. For (i), note that the hypotheses about the connectivity of level sets is
equivalent to injectivity of the relevant maps for the equal dimensional spaces
Z and Y . The injectivity of z 7→ Dyh(z, y) is an immediate consequence of
the definition of h, while the injectivity of y 7→ Dzh(z, y) follows from the
injectivity of y 7→ Dxb(x, y) and the identification above. The full rank of
the matrix D2zyh follows easily from our identification, as D
2
xyb has full rank
when restricted to a transversal sub-manifold.
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Half of (ii) is immediate, as Dyh(Z, y) = Dyb(X, y). To obtain the con-
vexity of Dzh(z, Y ), we use the identification above; note that Dzh(z, Y ) is
the projection of Dxb(x, Y ) onto the tangent space of S and the projection
of a convex set is convex.
Theorem 4.7. Assume that b satisfies (B0)-(B2). Then
(i) b satisfies (B3) on X × Y if and only if h satisfies (B3) on Z × Y .
(ii) b satisfies (B3u) on X × Y if and only if h satisfies (B3u) on Z × Y .
Proof. We first prove (i). Assuming the (B3) condition on b , we have
that ∂
4
∂t2∂s2
b(x(s), y(t))
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(0,0)
≥ 0 for appropriately chosen paths x(s) and
y(t), assuming x(s) ∈ S. Using the identification above, this implies that h
satisfies (B3).
Conversely, suppose now that h satisfies (B3). Choose curves x(s) in X
and y(t) in Y as in the definition of (B3). If x˙(0) /∈ TxLx(0), then we can
choose some surface n-dimensional surface S, intersecting Lx(0) transversely,
such that x(s) ∈ S for small s. In this case, using the local identification
above, (B3) on h implies
∂4
∂t2∂s2
b(x(s), y(t))
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(0,0)
≥ 0,
On the otherhand, suppose x˙(0) ∈ TxLx(0). It is well known (see [11]
[10] and [8]) that as long as Dxb(x(0), y(t)) is an afinely parameterized line
segment, we have
∂4
∂t2∂s2
b(x(s), y(t))
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(0,0)
=
∂4
∂t2∂s2
b(x˜(s), y(t)) (7)
for any other curve x˜(s) in X satisfying x˜(0) = x(0) and ˙˜x(0) = x˙(0). In
particular, we may choose a curve x˜(s) in Lx(0) with these properties. We
will show that
∂4
∂t2∂s2
b(x˜(s), y(t))
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(0,0)
= 0
which, by (7), will imply the desired result.
Now, for all s and t we have
dx˜
ds
(s) ∈ Tx˜(s)Lx˜(s) = null
(
D2xyb(x˜(s), y(t))
)
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and so
d2
dsdt
b(x˜(s), y(t)) =
(dx˜(s)
ds
)T
·D2xyb
(
x˜(s), y(t))
)
·
dy(t)
dt
= 0
As this holds for all s and t, we clearly have
∂4
∂t2∂s2
b(x˜(s), y(t))
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(0,0)
= 0
Turning now to (ii), if b satisfies (B3u), then so does h, using the identi-
fication exactly as in the argument for (B3). Converseley, suppose h satisfies
(B3u). For any curves x(s) and y(t) such that x˙(0)T ·D2xyb(x0, y0) 6= 0, we
must have x˙(0) /∈ TxLx, as Tx(0)Lx(0) = null
(
D2xyc(x(s), y(0))
)
. Then, pre-
ceding as above, we can find some surface S, transversal to Lx(0) such that
x(s) ∈ S for small s and use the local identification to verify (B3u).
Theorems 4.6 and 4.7, together with the main result in [8] immediately
imply the following result. It generalizes the main result of [8] to the m ≥
n setting, although, as we have shown in this section, when m > n the
hypothesis (B2) essentially reduces the problem to the m = n case.
Corollary 4.8. Assume b satisfies (B0)-(B2). The Ub,φ is convex if and
only if b satisifes (B3).
Figalli, Kim and McCann also proved the concavity of the functional P
provided that the cost function c is b convex [8]. In addition, recall that
a b-convex function c is called strictly b-convex if the function ycb(x) =
argmaxy∈Y b(x, y) − v(y) is continuous. Figalli, Kim and McCann showed
that P is strictly concave (a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the
optimal pricing strategy) provided either (i)(B3) holds and c is strictly b-
convex or (ii) (B3u) holds. We show below that the (strict) b-convexity of c
is equivalent to its (strict) h-convexity.
Proposition 4.9. Assume b satisfies (B0) - (B2). Then
(i)c is b-convex if and only if it is h-convex.
(ii)c is strictly b-convex if and only if it is strictly h-convex.
Proof. b-convexity of c means that c(y) = supx∈X b(x, y)− c
b(x); it’s h con-
vexity means that c(y) = supz∈Z h(z, y) − c
h(z). Therefore, to prove (i), it
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suffices to show supx∈X b(x, y)− c
b(x) = supz∈Z h(z, y)− c
h(z). we have
sup
x∈X
b(x, y)− cb(x) = sup
x∈X
b(x, y)− b(x, y0) + b(x, y0)− c
b(x)
= sup
x∈X
h(Q(x), y)− ch(Q(x)), by (6)
= sup
z∈Z
h(z, y)− ch(z),
as desired. Turning to (ii), as h(z, y)− c(y) = b(x, y)− b(x, y0)− c(y) for z =
Q(x), then clearly ycb(x) = ych(Q(x)). Now Q is continuous and surjective;
in addition, it is straightforward to show Q is an open mapping. Therefore,
continuity of ych is equivalent to that of ycb.
Corollary 4.10. Assume b satisfies (B0) − (B3), that c is b-convex and
that the measure µ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue. Then P
is concave. If either (i) b also satisifes (B3u) or (ii) c is strictly b-convex,
then P is strictly concave and its maximizer, the monopolist’s optimal pricing
plan, is unique.
Proof. By the result in [8], we only need to verify that ν = Q#µ is absolutely
continuous with respect to n-dimensional Lebesgue measure. This follows
from the coarea formula (see [17] for more details on the measure ν).
Under these conditions, other economic phenomena such as bunching
and the desirability of exclusion can be studied as in [8]. In particular, let
us say a few words about bunching, or the phenomenon that sees different
types choose the same good. Of course, in this setting one naturally expects
bunching because, as was noted by Basov [2], the m > n condition precludes
the full separation of types. When X is b-convex, the bunching that occurs
as a result of the difference in dimensions corresponds to identifying all types
in a single level set Lx. The results of this section imply that these are not
genuinely different types; that is, that they can be treated as a single type z
without any loss of pertinent information. However, genuine bunching occurs
when types in different level sets opt for the same good; Figalli, Kim and
McCann conjecture this occurs under (B3) [8].
Remark 4.11. In light of the previous section, these results mean that the
monopolist’s problem cannot be reduced to a maximization over a convex set
when m > n (at least as long as the extra dimensions encode real, economic
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information); this means that this class of problems is especially daunting.
However, in certain special cases these problems can be treated without relying
on convexity. Basov, for example, treats the case where Y is a convex graph
over n variables embedded in Rm and b(x, y) = x · y [2]. He then uses the
techniques of Rochet and Chone [19] to solve the monopolist’s problem in the
epigraph (a convex, n-dimensional set) and shows that it is actually optimal
to sell each consumer a product in the original graph. The case (m,n) = (2, 1)
with a general preference function is treated by Deneckere and Severinov [7],
again in the absence of a b-convex space of products.
5 n > m
When n > m, the generalized Spence Mirlees condition cannot hold; that
is, y 7→ Dxb(x, y) cannot be injective. Therefore, when faced with a pricing
schedule, a consumer’s utility will typically be maximized by a continuum of
products. The principal has the ability to offer only the good which will max-
imize her profits from that consumer; however, in doing so, she may exclude
products that maximize her profits from another consumer. One way around
this difficulty is to assume a tie-breaking rule as in Buttazzo and Carlier
[5]; that is, assume that the principal can persuade each consumer to select
the product that maximizes her profits (among those which maximize that
consumer’s utility function). This is in fact inherent in Carlier’s formulation
of the problem and proof of existence [6]. 2
As we show in this section, this difficulty can be avoided by assuming
b-convexity of X . Much like in the last section, this condition will allow
us to reduce to a problem where the dimensions of the two spaces are the
same. Intuitively, given a price schedule v(y), a consumer x will see the space
of goods disintegrate into sub-manifolds. If the price schedule is b-convex,
then the consumer’s preference b(x, y)−v(y) for good y will be maximized at
every point in (at least) one of these submanifolds. The b-convexity of X will
ensure that this disintegration will be the same for each x ∈ X . The principal
can then choose to offer only the good in each of these submanifolds which
2In [6], no extended Spence Mirrlees condition is assumed and so the function yvb(x) ∈
argmaxy∈Y b(x, y)−v(y) need not be uniquely determined by the b-convex v
b(x). If vb and
yvb maximize P , then yvb must satisfy a tie-breaking rule; that is, yvb(x) must be chosen
among elements in argmaxy∈Y b(x, y) − v(y) so as to maximize the profits v(yvb(x)) −
c(yvb(x)).
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will maximize her profits from consumers whose utilities are maximized on
that sub-manifold; the resulting space will be m dimensional. A special case
of this structure was exploited by Basov to prove a similar result for bilinear
preference functions [2].
The motivation behind the b-convexity of X is not as clear the motivation
behind as the b-convexity of Y , which we saw in section 3 was necessary
for the convexity of Ub. It is, however, present in the work of Rochet and
Chone [19] and Basov [2] on bilinear preference functions (where it reduces
to ordinary convexity) as well as that of Figalli, Kim and McCann [8]. In the
latter work, it is noted that b-convexity of X implies ordinary convexity after
a change of coordinates, which is essential in their proof of the genericity of
exclusion modelled on the work of Armstrong [1].
Using the method from the previous section, we note that ifX is b-convex,
and the level sets
Ly(x) := {y ∈ X : Dxb(y, x) = Dxb(x, y)}
are all connected, then they are independent of x; in this case, we will denote
them simply by Ly. Define the effective space of profits,W , to be the image of
y 7→ Dxb(x0, y) := Q(y), for some fixed x0. The effective preference function,
defined by h(x, w) = b(x, y) − b(x0, y), for y ∈ Q
−1(w), is well defined. We
then define a new, effective cost function by
g(w) = inf
{y:Q(y)=w}
c(y)− b(x0, y).
Our aim is to show that the maximizing the monopolist’s proftis is equiv-
alent to maximizing her effective profits; that is, the profits she could earn
by selling the set W of effective goods with production costs g to con-
sumers with effective preference function h. In practice, of course, she has
access to the real goods Y . However, offering a good y that minimizes
c(y) − b(x0, y) over Q
−1(w) for some w, to buyers with preference function
b(x, y) is equivalent to offering the effective good w to buyers with preference
function h(x, w). The following result implies that, in order to maximize
her profits, it is enough to offer only goods y with this property. Denote by
Mw = argminy:Q(y)=w c(y)− b(x0, y).
Proposition 5.1. . Given a price schedule v(y) and corresponding utility
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vb(x). Define v˜(y) by
v˜(y) = (vb)b(y) = sup
x∈X
b(x, y)− vb(x), if y ∈Mw for some w. (8)
= ∞, otherwise.
Then, v˜b(x) = vb(x) and, for almost all x, and any y ∈ argmaxy∈Y b(x, y)−
v(y), and y˜ ∈ argmaxy∈Y b(x, y) − v˜(y) we have v(y) − c(y) ≤ v˜(y˜) − c(y˜).
Furthermore, we have v˜(y˜)− c(y˜) = h(x,Q(y˜))− vb(x) + g(Q(y˜)) = b(x, y˜)−
vb(x) + c(y˜)
The interpretation of this result is that, in order to maximize her prof-
its, the monopolist should only offer those goods which maximize y 7→
b(x0, y) − c(y) over the set Q
−1(w) for some w. Any utility function vb
can be implemented by offering only these goods – or charging v(y) = ∞
for all other goods y. By doing this for a given utility, the monopolist forces
each consumer to buy the good which offers her the highest possible profit.
This resulting profit is the same as her effective profit for that price schedule.
Proof. We first show vb(x) = v˜b(x). It is well known that vb(x) = supx∈X b(x, y)−
(vb)b(y). As (vb)b(y) ≤ v˜(y), we have vb(x) ≥ v˜b(x). For a given x, choose
y such that vb(x) = b(x, y)− (vb)b(y). The argument in the proof of Lemma
4.3 implies that we have vb(x) = b(x, y)− (vb)b(y) for all y ∈ Ly = Q
−1(w),
where w = Q(y). In particular, choosing y˜ ∈Mw,
vb(x) = b(x, y˜)− (vb)b(y˜)
= b(x, y˜)− v˜(y˜)
≤ sup
y∈Y
b(x, y)− v˜(y)
= v˜b(x).
Therefore, vb(x) = v˜b(x). Now, choose x where vb is differentiable; this holds
for almost all x. For any y ∈ argmaxy∈Y b(x, y) − v(y), we have Dv
b(x) =
Dxb(x, y). Therefore Dv˜
b(x) = Dxb(x, y), which implies that, for any y˜ ∈
argmaxy∈Y b(x, y) − v˜(y) we must have y˜ ∈ Ly. Choosing y˜ ∈ Mw for w =
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Q(y), we also have
v(y)− c(y) = b(x, y)− vb(x)− c(y)
≤ sup
y∈Ly
b(x, y)− vb(x)− c(y)
= sup
y∈Ly
h(x,Q(y)) + b(x0, y)− v
b(x)− c(y)
= sup
y∈Ly
h(x,Q(y)) + b(x0, y)− v
b(x)− c(y)
= h(x,Q(y)− vb(x) + sup
y∈Ly
b(x0, y)− c(y)
= h(x,Q(y)− vb(x)− inf
y∈Ly
c(y)− b(x0, y)
= h(x,Q(y˜))− vb(x)− c(y˜) + b(x0, y˜)
= h(x,Q(y˜))− vb(x)− g(Q(y˜))
Noting that
h(x,Q(y˜))− vb(x)− c(y˜) + b(x0, y˜) = b(x, y˜)− v
b(x)− c(y˜)
= (vb)b(y˜)− c(y˜)
completes the proof.
Corollary 5.2. Maximizing the principal’s profits is equivalent to maximiz-
ing her effective profits.
Proof. The preceding result imlpies that, when maximizing P , it is sufficeient
to only consider pricing plans of the form (8), and that the profits from such
a plan v˜ are the same as effective profits made from offering the effective
pricing plan (vb)h.
The uniqueness argument in [8] relies on the b-convexity of c; we verify
below that this convexity carries over when we reduce to an equal dimensional
problem.
Proposition 5.3. (i)If c is b-convex, g is h-convex.
(ii) c is strictly b-convex if and only if g is strictly h-convex.
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Proof. For a b convex c, we have
g(w) = inf
{y:Dxb(x0,y)=w}
c(y)− b(x0, y)
= inf
{y:Dxb(x0,y)=w}
sup
x∈X
b(x, y)− cb(x)− b(x0, y)
= inf
{y:Dxb(x0,y)=w}
sup
x∈X
h(x, w)− cb(x)
= sup
x∈X
h(x, w)− cb(x)
Now, if c is strictly b-convex, then ycb(x) = argmaxy∈Y b(x, y) − c(y) is
continuous. Therefore,
ycb(x) = argmax
y∈Y
b(x, y)− c(y)
= argmax
y∈Y
h(x,Q(y))− c(y) + b(x0, y)
The maximization above can be broken into two steps: first, fix w ∈ W and
choose y ∈ Q−1(w) to maximize −c(y) + b(x0, y), or equivalently, minimze
c(y)− b(x0, y). Denote the resulting y = F (w). The second step is to then
choose w to maximize h(x, w)−c(F (w))+b(x0, F (w)) = h(x, w)−g(w); that
is, to find wgh(x). We have shown, then, that ycb(x)) = F (wgh(x)). Now note
that, as F (w) ∈ Q−1(w), we have, Q(ycb(x)) = wgh(x), which implies (ii), as
in the proof of Proposition 4.9.
The converse of part (i) in the preceding result is false – it is possible for
g to be h-convex without c being b convex. The reason for this is that the b
convexity of c is a property that concerns every y ∈ Y , while the h convexity
of g concerns only those y that minimize c(y)− b(x0, y) over a level set Ly.
One can choose c such that c(y) = supx∈X b(x, y)− c
b(x) for any y ∈Mw for
some w, but not for other goods y ∈ Y . Such a cost will not b-convex, but
the corresponding g will be h-convex.
As in the last section, under these conditions, rather than solving the
principal-agent problem on X × Y with preference function b and cost c we
can solve it on X ×W with preference function h and cost g. In particular,
direct analogues of Theorems 4.4, 4.6 and 4.7 and Corollaries 4.8 and 4.10
hold in this setting.
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6 Conclusions
We have shown that the b-convexity of the the space of products Y (one
half of condition (B2)) is necessary for the set Ub,φ of allowable utilites to be
convex. Furthermore, when m > n, we have shown that under this condition,
the problem reduces to a problem with equal dimensions. A similar result
holds when n > m and X is b-convex (the other half of(B2)).
We used these observations to show that, nominally, the main result of
Figalli, Kim and Mccann holds for any n and m: assuming (B0)-(B2),
Ub,φ is convex if and only if (B3) holds. However, we should bear in mind
that (B2) is a very strong condition when n 6= m; as mentioned above, it
effectively reduces the problem to a new screening problem where both spaces
have dimension min(n,m).
Economic consequences can then be deduced as in [8] under condition
(B3).
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